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Abstract
China’s huge economic growth over the past four decades has been observed by the
world and oftentimes acknowledged as an economic miracle. One of the main factors of this
extraordinary growth is the large labor population and comparatively cheap labor cost. With the
introduction of the Economic Reform and Opening-Up in the late 1970s, a large proportion of
the Chinese citizens started to seek better work opportunities outside their permanent residencies,
which was not restricted prior to the reform. These people, commonly quoted as the migrant
workers and consist more than 20% of the Chinese labor force, is being studied as a good
indicator which reflects both the internal migration and the economic growth of China. This
paper attempts to understand if family characteristics have any impact on individuals’ decisionmaking of becoming a migrant worker. The study finds that for each one extra person in the
family, an individual’s likelihood of becoming a migrant worker will increase by 1.36%;
whereas for each one extra child an individual has, the likelihood will decrease by 2.8%.
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1. Introduction
The fast-growing Chinese economy over the past few decades has been a huge
achievement of the country and a great model for other developing countries in the context of
globalization. From 1975 to 2017, China’s Gross Domestic Product has increased from $163
billion to $12.24 trillion, about a 75-times increase over a little more than 40 years (World Bank,
2019). Many have given the credit of such miraculous economic development to China’s
Economic Reform and the Open-Up policy started in 1978. As a result of the reform, the
mobility of workers in China was increased and people started to seek better work opportunities
in a much larger radius, namely cities or other provinces other than where they come from.
The contribution to this economic miracle from these floating labor forces cannot be
ignored. Because of the comparatively low cost of labor in the Chinese market and the large
population in China, businesses are able to grow and expand more rapidly than in countries
where labor costs are a huge proportion of the total cost. These labor forces, the migrant workers,
also form more than 20% of the whole labor market in China (National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2018b). Considering the already huge and still increasing proportion of the migrant
workers in China, it is necessary to take family factors into account since more households are
involved when more individuals are joining this group.
However, though policies started to allow people to work in cities other than their home
places, insufficient and incomplete policies were introduced to better the work/life condition of
migrant workers while they are in other cities. Gagnon et al. (2014) find in their study that
migrant workers, regardless of having urban or rural hukou, are being discriminated against in
the urban local labor market. Afridi et al. (2015) find in their study that the hukou system reduces
the performance of migrant workers.
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The hukou system, or the household registration system, is a method implemented by the
Chinese government to limit population mobility and to distinguish the city-countryside
relationships (Cheng and Seldon, 1994). It was initially designed to avoid possible social
problems that could take place if large and continuous population migration happens. Under the
hukou system, every citizen is bounded with a registered place of his/her hukou at birth, the
single permanent place of residence, such as City X in Province Y (Afridi, Li & Ren, 2015).
Together with the registered place, an individual also has a type of hukou attached to his/her
hukou status, being either an agricultural (or rural) hukou, or non-agricultural (or urban) hukou.
The type of hukou is inheritable from one’s parents or the household (Afridi, Li & Ren, 2015).
Both the registered place and type of hukou are changeable, although the requirements differ
from cities to cities.
There are studies that do not consider the hukou system as the only or the most significant
factor which affects migrant workers’ working opportunities. Chen and Fan (2016) also mention
in their study that even migrant workers successfully transferred their rural hukou to urban
hukou, their converted hukou status still shows some degrees of inferiority to the native urban
hukou holders and examples vary by cities. Wang et al. (2002) also find in their study that
migrant workers are not benefitting from the same level of social welfare and government
supports in their distant working cities as they are in their household registration place for hukou.
It now becomes a significant topic to think deeper about what makes an individual
become a migrant worker, especially when people start to figure out more benefits from working
locally, such as generating more financial income from their agricultural hukou (reference).
Many previous studies (Cai and Ng, 2014; Zhan, 2011) have focused on social and structural
factors regarding people’s willingness to be or status as migrant workers. In this paper, I focus on
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whether family characteristics of an individual have any impact on his/her status as a migrant
worker.
This article uses data from the 2016 China Family Panel Survey, a national longitudinal
survey, and focuses on individual and family level feedback. In this paper, I attempt to use the
Ordinary Least Square regression to detect the marginal effects of each independent variable has
on the dependent variable of migrant worker status. By running OLS regressions with a fixed
effect of provincial regions, I find that while some individual characteristics, such as age, gender,
and if an individual has a child, do not have a significant impact on migrant worker status, most
family characteristics display different levels of significance on one’s probability of becoming a
migrant worker.
The findings indicate that most family characteristics suggest positive signs to one’s
burden for the family, i.e. higher family income and more family members, will have a positive
effect on an individual’s decision-making of becoming a migrant worker. Family characteristics
that indicate negative signs to one’s responsibility for the family, i.e. number of children and the
living condition of their parents (alive, financially connected with the fam, and live with the
family), tend to have a negative impact on one’s status of being a migrant worker. While most
financial characteristics within the family do not display a significant level, the food and medical
expenditure of the household show negative impact on one’s migrant worker status. The variable
of family wages has a positive sign of migrant worker status which is different from the variable
of family income. This contradiction may due to the difference in observation numbers.
In general, variables indicating burdens from the family, such as if parents are financially
connected with the individual, number of members of a family, and almost all categories of
family expense, have a positive correlation with the dependent variable migrant worker. The
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more one need to take care of the family, the higher possibility he/she will have in becoming a
migrant worker. On the other hand, some core variables indicating supports from the family,
such as total income of the family and total savings of the family, will have a negative
correlation with the dependent variable migrant worker. The better the family can financially
sustain itself, the less likely an individual will choose to become a migrant worker. For every
1,000 yuan increase of one’s household wage annually, the probability of him/her to become a
migrant worker will increase by 0.02%. For every extra child an individual has, the probability of
him/her in becoming a migrant worker will decrease by 2.8%. A high education degree will
increase one’s chance of becoming a migrant worker by 7.34%, and having an urban hukou will
increase the chance by 9.61%.
This paper contributes to the topic about internal migration in China by looking at
individuals from the family level. Most previous studies regarding individuals’ decision-making
on becoming migrant workers focus on institutional factors (Shen, 2013; Zhan, 2011), the status
quo and foreseeable trends of migrant workers (Xing and Zhang, 2017; Zhao, 2003; Cai and Ng,
2014; Hui, Yu and Ye, 2014), and the externalities that internal migration brings to the target
regions (Han and Li, 2017; Combes, Demurger, and Li, 2015). I intend to study how families
affect individuals’ decision-making on working away from home from perspectives of both
family configuration and monetary support and burden.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the contributions of
previous literature on the migrant worker topic in China and compare to the internal migration
situation in India. Section 3 briefly presents the contributions this paper has towards the broader
topic of migrant workers in China. Section 4 provides the data and methodology used in this
study. Section 4 provides the results of the regressions and Section 5 discusses limitations and
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policy implications of this study. Section 6 concludes. Longer tables are described at the end of
the paper.
2. Literature Review
Internal labor migration has been a major developmental issue that most, if not all,
countries are constantly facing. While it seems to be human nature that people tend to move to
places where they are economically better-off, it is still a policy concern for the government to
regulate such migration to ensure both developed and developing regions have equal
opportunities. For individuals who were not born in large cities, there is always the option to
leave their families in the rural area and seek higher-paying employment opportunities. However,
it has never been a simple choice to make, especially in China. Regardless of personal concerns
that one needs to think of when comparing the pros and cons of working in another city, there are
also external institutional factors, such as the hukou system, that restrict people from going to
work away from home.

2.1 The Hukou System
Since it was implemented when the state was founded, the hukou system had a huge
impact on people’s everyday life, including food subsidies, employment, housing, education,
medical care, marriage and military enlistment (Wu and Treima, 2004). Although citizens with
different types of hukou are entitled to different ways of enjoying benefits from the state, it is
generally acknowledged that urban hukou holders are favored by policies much more than rural
hukou holders. For instance, though all children are eligible for the 9-year complementary
education provided by the state, only children with urban hukou are allowed to enroll in school in
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cities, whereas children with rural hukou can only go to nearby public schools where
infrastructures and quality of educators are worse than schools in cities (Chan and Buckingham,
2008). Moreover, when it comes to applying for universities, students with local urban hukou are
normally favored by the universities than students with a registered hukou that is non-local. The
favoring policy normally takes place in the form of different requirement for national exam score
standards. For instance, a local college candidate may only need to achieve 500 in the national
university entrance exam in order to pass the requirement line for consideration, whereas a
student who goes to the same school may need to achieve 520 because of his non-local hukou
status. Education is only a part of this inequality in receiving public benefits based on people’s
urban/rural hukou status ().
However, the restriction of hukou system has becoming more and more loose. Since the
early 1980s, the hukou system has been softened along with the economic reform and rural
residents were permitted to move to other places to work and live with a granted temporary
hukou registration (Shen, 2013). The population mobility has thus increased and more and more
rural residents choose to work in the cities for higher wages and better living conditions. Many
local governments now use the urban hukou enrollment as an incentive for fresh graduates to
stay and work at the college cities or try to attract graduates to relocate by introducing favoring
hukou settlement policies. For instance, the local government of Qingdao, a Top-3 city by GDP
in Shandong Province, started to allow people under 45 with a bachelor’s degree to apply for its
urban hukou.
According to Chen and Fan (2016), as early as 2001, small cities like Changzhi in Shanxi
province had also started hukou reforms. However, Chen and Fan (2016) highlight that there is a
“mismatch” between the soften hukou reform and people’s willingness of transferring their rural
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hukou status to urban hukou status. The reason behind is that only middle to small cities are very
open to accept migrant workers with rural hukou and grant them with urban hukou; larger cities
are still being restrictive. However, it seems that instead of having an urban hukou, people now
care more about which city that the urban hukou status is linked to. The issue has evolved to, as
Chen and Fan (2016) summarize, “the question of where more so than what.”

2.2 Migration Issues in China
One of the most discussed migration issues in China is employment discrimination.
Gagnon et al. (2014) finds that migrant workers are discriminated against in the urban labor
market which happens mainly in the sense of wage levels. They use data from a 2005 OnePercent Population Survey conducted by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The sample
size is roughly 2.3 million individuals from 31 provinces and other provincial regions. The
findings show that almost all income gaps between rural migrant workers and urban residents
can be explained by differences in individual characteristics. When leaving out the hukou system
as a variable, 40% of the income gaps remain unexplained. Such finding suggests that the
differences in income between rural migrants and urban residents are mainly caused by the
hukou system and that rural migrants face wage discrimination when working in urban regions.
One limitation from this study is that although urban migrants are treated as a comparison group
to the rural migrants, distance and level of medical security were not taken into account. Given
that migrants cannot enjoy the health insurance outside their home county/city, rural migrants
may appear to be more vulnerable than urban migrants if either their home county is far away
from the city or the medical conditions are worse than urban migrant workers.
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There are also other social issues that come along with the gradual reform of the hukou
system and increasing migrant population from larger cities to small and medium cities. Huang
and Fei (2016) find that rural migrant workers in cities have a very low participation rate in
welfare programs. Although some cities have introduced policies that encourage migrant workers
to participate in welfare programs, for instance Beijing and Shenzhen which offer a lower
contribution rates for the social insurance program, the rate of participation is still low. The
reasons behind the opt-out on insurance include migrant workers’ high mobility among cities and
rural areas, the constantly changing policies on insurance plans, informal employment that offers
no insurance, insufficient wages for insurance, and ignorance about the insurance program. Other
aspects of the migration issues, such as education of left-behind children (whose parents all work
in the cities and grow up with other relatives) (Wang, 2014; Shi et al., 2016) and criminality
caused by or involved with the “floating population” (another word for migrants with negative
connotations).
While it might be true that most migrant workers opt out of the welfare programs because
of their constant mobility, there are many other possibilities that may happen regardless of their
work status. For instance, Huang and Fei (2016) does not consider migrant workers who work
without formal contracts and thus are not covered with any form of formal insurance or welfare.
It is true that it is difficult to capture samples that involve illegal behaviors, but the authors can
still work on what people think about the compensation process if misfortune happens. It is also
highly possible that migrant workers do not fully trust in the government welfare program
because they for some reasons do not expect the program to work properly. It is more
meaningful for the policymakers to think of their own deficiencies, such as the implementation

11

of compensations, rather than thinking this issue as institutional and not work in an efficient way
that target migrant worker community accepts.
Yang and Zhou (2017) also conduct a study on the topic of migrant workers’ attainment
in basic pension insurance. They find that for labor outflow provinces, the resident population
ratio has a negative effect on expenditure levels; whereas the resident population ratio in labor
inflow provinces have a positive effect on expenditure levels. This is mainly an institutional
factor which migrants can only enjoy the benefits from basic pension if they return to their
household registered province. Most migrant workers would therefore choose not to join the
basic pension insurance plan. However, the study also finds that after 2011 when the migrant
pension insurance shift mechanism has been gradually promoted across provinces, the number of
migrants involved in the basic pension insurance has increased. This study is helpful to my study
as it points out the difference of changes in one aspect of the labor migration issue and suggests a
possible reason why rural residents would choose (or not choose) to work in cities. More
discussion on the changes in institutional factors will be mentioned in 2.6 The Institutional
Reform part.

2.3 Internal Migration in India
India is another developing country which internal migration supports a huge part of
domestic labor supply and contributes continuously to the development in cities. India and China
have many similarities in various aspects. The most relevant ones in this case are the facts that
they are both developing countries in Asia with large population and land area. Agriculture is
also one of the significant industries for these two countries.
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Unlike China, India does not have administrative restrictions like the Chinese hukou
system and everyone is legally free to work across provinces. However, Kone et al. (2018)
indicate that most labor migration activities are not conducted cross-state but rather crossdistricts within the state. The authors use data from National Census of India in 2001, as well as
additional household and labor force data from the National Sample Survey between 1999-2000
and 2004-2005. Although 30% of the population are defined as migrant workers from the
population sample, the authors find that the migration activity happening between districts within
a state is almost 50% higher than activities across states. Additionally, they also find that the
population of inter-district female migrants are almost three times more than their male
counterparts due to the “well-known migration of women within the same or neighboring
districts for marriage” (Kone, et al. 2018).
Their study clearly shows that although administrative measures regarding one’s
household status is not present, internal migrants in India are still impeded by the state borders
when migrating. To explain such phenomenon, Kone et al. (2018) suggest that three institutional
factors can apply to the impediment of state borders, including inadequate social welfare, home
bias to educational access, and public employment. Migrant workers may be well aware of the
fact that they are excluded from the subsidized food and admission to public hospitals. Public
universities and employers are also in huge favor of home residents compared to inter-state
immigrants. Since most migrants are people who live below the poverty line or with very limited
income, it is not surprising that they tend to avoid inter-state migration since social welfare,
education, and job opportunities are very important for them. Kone et al. (2018) use variables
that relate to states in India, namely if the states migrants left and enter for work are neighboring
or not, to detect possible relations between migration and cultural effects which vary by
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locations. For my study, I use control for provincial regions in the OLS regression for the
possible cultural variations. This study can also be compared to the Chinese migrants in the sense
that the decision-making of internal migration is not normally affected by wage level but other
institutional factors.
Khan (2017), on the other hand, indicates that many inter-state migrant workers are
actually skilled workers and in fact earn higher salaries on average compared with native
workers in Indian cities. He uses individual level data from the Employment and Unemployment
and Migration Survey from 2007-2008 conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization
which includes over 500,000 individual samples. According to the regression analysis, neither
return to work experience nor years of schooling between the two groups has significant impact
on the wage gap, indicating that the gap is not caused by the difference in productivity of
workers.
Findings from Khan’s (2017) study can be used to explain why workers in India choose
to migrate inter-state given all the institutional impediments. While the same logic could be
applied to the migrant workers’ status in China, it is noteworthy that the inter-state migrants in
China are normally comprised of peasants with lower education level. What migrant workers
expect from working in urban areas may not be higher wages than the native workers but a
higher wage than working locally. Additionally, given the existence of the hukou system,
migrant workers in the urban areas may face discrimination from the labor market due to various
reasons. For instance, employers may need to pay extra for migrant workers’ housing and may
need to grant extra vacations for family visits. The labor market is narrower for the migrant
workers since employers tend to avoid extra cost when recruiting.
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There are many factors that could be helpful when studying similar topic on China. In
spite of similar institutional factors such as local protectionism in education and individuals’
various preference over internal migration, the difference preference in gender is an interesting
factor to look at. Though I do not expect a similar or higher gender ratio in favor of female in
studies on internal migrants in China, there is for sure a gender difference on the status of
becoming migrant workers. In many Chinese people’s perspectives, females are often supposed
to play the role at home with tasks such as taking care of children and parents, while males are
often supposed to act as the major labor force and perhaps the only source of income. However,
we have yet to see a very unequal number of female migrant workers compared to male migrant
workers. What in fact matters more to individuals in becoming a migrant worker may instead be
the family rather than their extinctive roles at home.

2.4 Incentives for Migrant Workers
The biggest incentives for migrant workers to leave their homes and work in urban areas
are higher wages, opportunities of transferring hukou from rural to urban, and better living
conditions in the city. Qin et al. (2015) use data from a household survey conducted by the
Ministry of Agriculture of China from 2003 to 2007 which has a sample size of over 75,000
individuals across 17 provinces. The authors only include individuals aged 16-65 that are neither
student nor non-farm business owners, meaning the sample primarily includes workers. The
descriptive data indicates that during the five-year period, the average annual earnings of a
migrant worker is 6225.98 yuan (CNY), whereas the income per capita on the village level was
only a little over 3,000 yuan. This indicates that by working in the cities, migrant workers will
have a higher income compared to those who do agricultural work at the in rural areas.
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In spite of higher incomes, migrant workers also aspire to live and work in cities that can
offer more possibilities, such as work opportunities, entertainments, infrastructures, and
convenience in life in general. Xing and Zhang (2017) find in their study that migrant workers
are willing to give up part of their earnings in exchange for a better city to live in. They mention
that although the Chinese government tries to “restrict population growth in in large cities but
encourages growth in small and medium-sized cities,” migrant workers tend to vote with their
feet for whichever city they are more willing to work and live in, which in most cases, are large
cities. They use the 2005 One-Percent Population Survey conducted by the China’s National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and eliminate samples that do not fit their definition of migrant
workers. Xing and Zhang’s definition of migrant workers are stricter and must fulfill all 7
conditions from living in urban areas to must be a household head in the city. It is a thorough
definition of migrant workers given that the raw data set they use contain over 2.3 million
individuals. The only difference they made on the definition in this sample selection compared to
other studies on migrant workers is that they only include household head, which in most cases
are male. The authors were able to include almost 25,000 individual samples across 95 cities
from all provinces. They then use semi-parametric approach to predict earnings of these migrant
workers.
For the city level regressions, they used data from the 2005 Urban Statistical Yearbook of
China to collect city characteristics, some of which include consumption of tradable and nontradable composite goods, population size, non-monetary cost of migration, distance from one’s
home village to city, and income. They also collect data online from China Meteorological Data
Sharing Service System for average January temperature as part of city amenities. The authors
also set city fixed effects for every destination city as a way to predict their willingness to move
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to cities. In this part, they set Beijing as the baseline of 0 with a fixed effect, and results of other
cities highly match people’s common knowledge about those cities: cities with higher life quality
and employment opportunities, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen, are ranked in the first places.
However, it is very controversial to choose Beijing as the baseline but not another city in China.
Except being the capital of the state, Beijing is neither the most economically developed city by
GDP (Shanghai is ranked the first in 2017) (NBSC, 2018a), nor the best destination city for
migration in terms of level of difficulties to change one’s hukou status.
In short, by conducting a two-step regression, Xing and Zhang (2017) find that cities with
larger populations are normally recognized to have more city amenities. The regression indicates
that in general, migrant workers are willing to give up roughly 1.7% of their income in exchange
for a 1% larger city population. This study is relevant to my research as it explains why many
migrant workers choose to work in large cities and how much are they willing to go to these
cities. The quantified city amenities are very helpful to understand the large-city impact and the
results also match people’s view towards large cities in general.
However, while it might be true in most cases that cities with larger populations often
have facilities and infrastructures that can provide a better life quality, it is hard to say if an
increase in migration causes the city to develop faster and fulfil the increasing needs of this
larger population; or that cities with better developments becomes more attractive to potential
migrants. I am more inclined to the first hypothesis since one of the initial purposes of the hukou
system was to restrict mass population migration. It is also difficult to identify or quantify how
much benefits an individual will gain from moving to a larger city. Since the responses are based
on national survey, it is difficult to tell if potential migrants themselves are actually capable of
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calculating the extra benefits of moving to a larger city at the cost of 1.7% of their income, or
that they only expect that the life will be better by hearing from others.

2.5 Migration Externalities
While migrant workers are directly involved with many civic issues, there are also
externalities that they bring to the urban areas. Combes et al. (2015) find in their study that labor
migration may increase the wages on native workers in the urban areas as well. They use the
2007 Urban Household Survey to collect individual data and extract migrant share in different
cities from the One-Percent 2005 China Population Survey. They also collect city-level data
from the 2008 China City Statistical Yearbook.
The OLS regression indicates that the migrant share of cities is highly correlated with the
employment density. The study also finds evidence that a large positive correlation between the
city share of migrants and the natives’ wages. The authors estimate that about two-thirds of such
impact results from migrant/native complementarity in the production function and the rest from
agglomeration economies.
However, there are some shortcomings in the study. Regarding the individual data
selection, the authors did not include “owners of private or individual enterprises” since they find
it impossible to separate wages from profit. Whereas in Xing and Zhang’s (2017) study, they
find that migrant workers are “much more likely to be self-employed,” though they have a
“much lower monthly income than urban workers.” The elimination of this group of migrant
workers may result in a substantial loss to the whole population. Another drawback from the
NBS data is that no working times are recorded. Extra working hours could apply to many
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migrant workers if they work in the manufacturing or construction industry. Another possible
shortcoming is that the individual data on migrant workers did not distinguish between rural
migrant workers and urban migrant workers. While most rural migrant workers are normally
unskilled, urban migrant workers can be skilled. The proportion of these two types of migrant
workers may affect the result regarding complementarity in the production function since urban
migrant workers may conduct same level of works compared to native workers. To be more
precise about their findings, the authors also stated that the impact from labor migration on
occupation and location choice since the current Chinese data cannot be assessed on it. The study
is interesting and useful for my research as it shows that labor migration may also bring benefit
to the cities which may change the discrimination that migrant workers are facing and the policymaking in cities regarding migration.

2.6 The Institutional Reform
Over the years that the temporary hukou system has been implemented, the labor
migration from rural areas to the urban cities has increased. Issues that are believed to be caused
by institutional factors are revealed, such as the discrimination in job markets that migrant
workers are facing. Shen (2013) mentions in her study that the relaxed hukou system in the early
1980s was a huge institutional driver for the labor migration as rural residents were able to work
in cities with a temporary hukou registration. The average annual growth rate of temporary
population that the migrant workers form is almost 15% from 1982 to 2005. However, as
literatures have suggested, the temporary hukou system also causes livelihood issues to migrant
workers, such as basic pension, unequal wages, and health care services. After thirty more years
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of the labor migration, both the government and the potential migrant workers have started to act
in ways that best match their own interest.
From migrant workers’ perspectives, some of them choose to change their expectation
about working in the cities. Some migrant workers, especially who come from the rural areas and
have farmland at home, tend to work part-time and give up the possibility of moving their hukou
from rural to urban. Cai and Ng (2014) find that because of the two major institutional factors in
China, the hukou system and the household responsibility system (HRS), rural residents with
farming land ownership tend to act like “part-peasants” and split their labor force for two or
more jobs. While hukou limits their access to public welfare in cities, HRS separates their
farming lands into small plot sizes that are difficult for agricultural machines and thus require a
more intense labor demand.
Chen and Fan (2016) also find that urban hukou is becoming less and less attractive to the
migrant workers. By collecting data from the Floating Population Dynamic Monitoring Surveys
(FPDMS) from 2010 to 2012, the authors find that though most migrant workers (over 60%) plan
to stay in cities in long-term (5 years or more), only 21% of them are willing to transfer their
rural hukou to urban hukou. Other studies that the authors refer to also show that migrant
workers are willing to stay for a long period in cities but are also less willing to obtain an urban
hukou at the cost of losing their rural hukou. The authors also point out that although the current
hukou reform discipline is to “fully remove barriers for peasants to settle in towns and small
cities,” peasants seem to favor larger cities much more than small cities. This finding also
matches Xing and Zhuang’s (2017) paper regarding migrant workers’ willingness to give up part
of their income for larger cities. Findings from these studies can be used in my research to
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explain why rural residents choose not to work in larger cities and why migrant workers choose
to work regardless of the disutility.
From the government’s perspective, some changes have been introduced to the hukou
system on various levels. Hui (2014) shows how the gradual reform on hukou system affects the
migrant workers in Shenzhen, one of the most economically developed cities and biggest migrant
destination in China. In 2010, the State Council approved the public rental-housing policy that
would allow households who cannot afford private-sector housing and are not eligible for other
kinds of government housing to apply for. The authors use face-to-face survey interviews with
contemporary migrant workers in Shenzhen to collect data and 478 migrants were successfully
interviewed. From the study, the authors find that while most migrant workers are willing to
move into the public rental housing if available to them, most of them do not choose because
being treated differently for their non-local hukou identity. In fact, their rural hukou does not
seem to make significant differences to their decision-making in housing. What seems to be
more important to them are the dissatisfaction of their current housing in the chengzhongcun
(urban villages). This finding is very important to my study in the sense that it could explain why
some migrant workers seem to not care about their rural hukou status. Many of them in fact care
more about short-term benefits, such as their living condition at the moment, rather than longterm returns, as such urban hukou that may take years for them to get.

3. Contributions
The previous literature has focused on different aspects of the labor migration issue in
China and has offered many insights to my study. Most of the articles use the One-Percent
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Population Survey, Urban Household Survey, and Urban Statistical Yearbook to collect
individual and city level data. In my research, I plan to use data from China Family Panel Studies
(CFPS) conducted by the Peking University from 2010 to 2016. This data is a nationally
representative data set that includes individual, household and village level data. I plan to include
the household data along with individual data to conduct my research since it is a category that
has not been studied very often in the previous research. By using the household level data, I will
be able to study how family factors can contribute to individuals’ decision-making in working in
the city or not. The family factors are important to this question not only because that family is a
crucial part of the traditional values that most Chinese people acknowledge, but also that
individuals are legally and tightly connected to their families in many aspects, namely the hukou
system and one’s obligation to financially support their direct relatives (parents, spouse and
children). To study what makes an individual become a migrant worker, one needs to put himself
in the shoes of these individuals and think what are their concerns in real life. In this case, family
is undoubtedly one of the biggest concerns that one needs to consider before leaving home and
work in other places.

3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Source
The data used in the study is drawn from the latest wave of the China Family Panel Study
(CFPS), the CFPS 2016. CFPS is a national longitudinal general survey conducted by the
Institute of Social Science Survey of Peking University in China. The survey collects data at the
individual level, family level, and community level, and surveys 16,000 households in 25
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provincial regions in China (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai,
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Hainan) (Xie & Lu, 2015)1. CFPS started its first baseline survey
in 2010 and finished three waves of follow-up surveys at the same scale in 2012, 2014, and 2016.
CFPS data is available on Peking University Open Research Data platform (reference).
The CFPS survey focuses on the social changes of contemporary China and both the
economic and non-economic well-being of Chinese citizens (Xie et al. 2017). The questionnaire
of CFPS includes a variety of socioeconomic aspects of households and individuals, such as
economic activities, family member relationships, education, welfare, population migration, and
physical and mental health. It is also the latest, most thorough, and perhaps the only publicly
available data that features internal migration in China at the family level.
The original data package contains three data sets of which survey questions are
conducted at different levels. Although the CFPS survey consists of both face-to-face survey and
phone interviews, the questionnaires applied are almost identical. After merging the datasets of
adult, family economy and family configuration at the individual level (i.e. using unique personal
ID for the merging) the valid number of observations has gone down to 36,213 from 58,179 in
the raw data set.

*While the source of CFPS did not mention clearly as in why these regions were not included, it could
be that these regions are either difficult to conduct a thorough field survey or cannot represent that the
majority of the Chinese population due to economic and political factors.
1
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3.2 Descriptive Data
To clean the data set, I eliminate all the invalid observations, including all missing data in
non-monetary related variables such as age, gender, hukou status, and work location, as well as a
few economic variables where missing data consist of a minority of the “not applicable”
observations, such as expense and government subsidiary (both personal and home level).
However, there are many monetary variables that include a massive amount of missing
observations (more than half of the entire sample size), such as income, family wage, and
revenue from land rental. To maintain a good size of the data, I changed all the missing
observations of non-economic variables to 0, such as parent alive, leaving those in economic
variables as missing, such as income. The missing observations inevitably influence the
regression results by shrinking the valid sample size. While the regression result from the last
model consists roughly 20% of the initial population size, the sample size of this result still
manages to maintain above 3,000 observations, making the result valid for interpretation.
For the definition of a migrant worker, I refer to a single question asking the work
location of individuals in the questionnaire for adult (see attachment 1). The options are 1) This
village/residential community; 2) Another village/residential community in this township; 3)
Another township in this county/city/district.; 4) Another county/city/district in this province; 5)
Another province in mainland China; 6) Outside of Mainland China (including Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan); 7) Online store; and 8) Not fixed. Any observation with the answer
“unknown” is eliminated. In this study, an individual with any answer from option 2 to option 6
is considered a migrant worker as he/she work remotely away from his/her residential area. One
possible ambiguity is that an individual can work overseas in foreign territories and become
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ineligible as the purpose of this study is to focus on internal migration. However, since only 21
individuals answered option 6, the possible distraction to the results is very low.
Table 1 shows that the total amount of valid observations for migrant worker, a binary
dependent variable used in the regression model, is 16,024. The mean value of 0.66 indicates that
about two thirds of the population in my sample are considered as migrant workers, which is
much higher than the 37.17% that migrant workers consist out of the entire national labor force
of China (NBSC, 2018b). The main difference is the definition of migrant worker between my
study and the official one. For my research, I posit that working away from one’s permanent
residence has a stronger impact for individuals rather than their inherited hukou status, given that
many urban hukou holders also choose to work in cities larger than their hukou registered city
and the desire of people willing to work in larger cities has also been discovered (Xing & Zhang,
2017). Therefore, I focus more on the fact that people work in places away from home is more
significant than why people work in different industries other than their inherited hukou type.

The sample size of the study has come down to 16,036 observations from over 53,000
individual observations in the initial data set. The binary variable of gender (which male=1 and
female=0) with a mean value of 0.507 shows that the population is almost equally distributed
with both sexes. The variable age indicates that the average year of age in the sample is 42.03
years old. The hukoudummy variable indicates if an individual has an “agricultural (or rural)
hukou status” (=0), or a “non-agricultural (or urban) hukou status” (=1). The mean value
indicates that there are more individuals with rural hukou rather than urban hukou. The
marriagedummy is a variable with “only married” (=1) and “not married” (=0). Any other
marital statuses such as widowed, divorced, and cohabitation are considered as not married here.

25

The reason behind this is that only married individuals have legal responsibility to support
his/her spouse and their family economically. Child is a binary variable with 0 indicating “no
child” and 1 indicating “has child”. Singlechild is a sub-variable of Child and indicates if an
individual has only 1 child (=1) or has more than 1 children (=0). It is used to reflect if the
Family Planning Policy2 has any effect on the population in this data set.
Education indicates the highest education that an individual has received by 2016. It is a
ranked variable with 1 indicating “illiterate/semi-literate” and 8 indicating “doctoral degree”.
The variable is categorized into 3 parts, namely lowedu, midedu, and highedu. The 3
subcategories are used to display the distribution of educational level more precisely. The mean
of 3.024 of the education variable indicates that the average education level of this sample is
slightly above “junior high school” (=3), which matches the higher observations of midedu
compared to the other 2 categories. Parentalive indicates if either of an individual’s parents are
“alive” (=1), or “both dead” (=0).
Table 2 displays a group of independent variables from the category of family-related
characteristics. It is designed to demonstrate an individual’s economic obligation beyond
him/herself and the number and type of family members that he/she may need to be responsible
for. For instance, number of children indicates that although some individuals may need to take
care of 10 children, the majority of this sampling individuals only have 1 or 2 children. The
mean of 1.277 may be related to the One-Child Policy that has been enforced for 2 to 3 decades
in China but that is not a major concern in this study.

2

The Family Planning Policy is referring to the One-Child Policy which only allows Chinese citizens to have 1
child in most situations. The policy was implemented in the 1980 to control the fast-growing population of
China and was written in the Constitution in 1982. This controversial policy was terminated in 2015 with an
amendment of allowing couples to have 2 children in most cases (Gu, Feng, Guo, and Zhang, 2007).
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Live in Family measures if the individual lives with the family (=1) or not (=0). Parent
Finance measures if either parent of an individual is financially connected with him/her. It is
very surprising that the mean value of Parent Finance is only 0.211 as I would expect a much
higher value, since the filial responsibility is a crucial part in the Asian cultures and to financially
support one’s parents is widely acknowledged as a necessary obligation. Parent live with Family
is a binary variable and indicates if parents of the individual live with the family or not. Family
Count is about how many members in an individual’s family and the mean value of 4.295 is as
expected. I would also expect a higher mean value for individuals with rural hukou since OneChild Policy was in general less strict when it comes to execution in the rural areas.
Family Wage and Family Expense are all family level variables. The reason why that
Family Expense is much higher than the other two variables may be due to the fact of a high
volume of missing values in income-wise variables. Since all missing values from monetary
variables are changed into 0, the mean values of these variables appear to be much lower than
they should be. It is a problem of many social surveys conducted in China and previous literature
has also reflected similar problems with data sets published in China (reference). However, it is
also very interesting that respondents of the CFPS survey tend to answer most questions about
expenditures while avoiding questions regarding incomes.
The last variable, Total Family Members as Migrant Worker or Villagers measures the
amount of an individual’s family member who work as a migrant worker or work for other
villagers for agricultural work. The mean value is very low at 0.873 and may suggest that the
average individual from the sample do not have other family members who work outside their
residential areas.
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Table 3 is a set of descriptive statistics at the family level (except income, total
retirement subsidiary and total government subsidiary are at the individual level) and for all
monetary variables. The units of all mean values are in Chinese Yuan (CNY)3 and indicate a
yearly value. Due to the data restriction, some variables only have very limited valid
observations. For instance, there only a little more than 4,000 observations in income. However,
if compared the mean value of income with the mean value of family income, which has a very
complete number of observations at over 16,000, we can tell that the sample group for income
can represent the whole population group. The mean value of income is more than one third of
the mean value of family income, which seems reliable given that the average members of a
household in my data set is 4.3 (Table 2).
Land rental indicates how much income the family will gain by lending their land to
other villagers for farming or other purposes. The low valid observation number at 1460 suggests
that renting out their lands does not seem to be a popular choice to use their lands. I assume that
despite interviewees who refuse to answer the question, most households with ownership to
lands will either use the land on their own or hire someone to farm the land on their behalf.
Total retirement subsidiary and total government subsidiary have a moderate number of
observations, since only a portion of the population sample is over the legal retirement age of 5560 for females and males respectively. The mean of total retirement subsidiary is almost 20,000
yuan, making it half of the mean value of individual income. This suggests that individuals who
are retired should be able to financially take care of themselves. This indicator may also explain
the low mean value of variable parent finance in Table 1.

3

The recent currency exchange rate of CNY to USD is about 1:0.15 as of 04/30/19.
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Food, house, and medical expenditure are the top 3 expenses for a family and mortgage1
seems to only consist a fairly small proportion. Mortgage1 is a revised variable indicating how
much unpaid mortgage a household has till 2016. It was initially recorded in the interview in
10,000 yuan per unit and I multiple the observations by 10,000 for the better presentation in this
table. Less than? 2,000 individuals claim that their households are on debt for housing. As part of
the expenditure category, mortgage has a much lower valid response rate compared with other
categories in food, house, and medical. However, the response rate for housing expenditure is
high and have a mean value over 11,000. This may suggest that most households in my
population sample are not in debt for their housing but need to rent a house or spend money on
maintaining their current housing. It may also because that most rural hukou holders have their
own lands and are almost free from policy to build homes on their lands. It would be unnecessary
for most of these households to have mortgage if housing is not a major part of their family
expenditure plan.
One of the main assumption of my research topic is that migrant workers, compared to
non-migrant workers from the same hukou registration place, tend to have a higher income. For
this study, I choose 5 provincial regions with the highest population group from my data set and
compare the income of migrant worker and non-migrant worker groups within each of these 5
provincial regions (Appendix I). I also use a 2-sample t-test to show if the findings are valid. 4
provincial regions out of 5 show a negative t-value. For the only group with a positive t-value
and a p-value of less than 0.05, the income of migrant workers is higher than their counterpart
from the same provincial region. However, with the t-test value at 0.307, the result is still
insignificant and cannot support that migrant workers earn more than non-migrant workers when
they come from the same provincial regions. Qin (2015) presents in her study that migrant
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workers earn more than non-migrant worker at a sample of more than 30,000 individuals.
However, the data she used is at village level but not provincial level. This difference may be the
reason why the 2 descriptive statistics have different signs of relation.

3.3 Regression Model
I estimate a Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model to display all the marginal effects of the
coefficient results. Models 1, 2, and 3 indicate individual characteristics, family characteristics,
and monetary characteristics respectively. It is more representative to display how different
variables can influence the probability of an individual to become a migrant worker. I attempt to
use Model 1 (with variables in X1 category) to indicate the influence on the dependent variable
from an individual’s own characteristics, Model 2 (with variables in X2 category) for his/her
basic family characteristics, and Model 3 (with variables in X3 category) for his/her family
characteristics in the economic sense.
𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 = 𝛽1 Agei + 𝛽2 Age2 +
𝛽3 Childi + 𝛽4 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢 + 𝛽7 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 +
𝛽9 𝐻𝑢𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽10 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀

𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 = 𝛽1 Num of Childreni + 𝛽2 Liveinfami +
𝛽3 Parentfinancei + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒1000𝑖 +
𝛽7 𝑇𝑡𝑙_𝑓𝑎𝑚_𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖 + province +𝜀

𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 = 𝛽1 Incomei + 𝛽2 Savingi +
𝛽3 Medi + 𝛽4 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽10 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀
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For Model 1, I expect that age and gender will not have a significant influence or may
have a neutral effect on the dependent variable migrant worker. I expect a negative significant
effect on hukoudummy as in general, since individuals with rural hukou tend to be more
interested to work away from home (reference). I also expect a positive effect on education
because people with higher education will need to seek better work opportunities in larger cities
for a higher return on salary. Although there can be individuals who were educated higher and
live/work in large cities, the probability is much smaller consider the population size and land
size of China, the population size of educated individuals, and number of large cities.
For Model 2, I expect that the more economic burdens an individual receives from the
family, such as more children to raise, have both parents to look after, and higher than average
family members, the more likely an individual will choose to work as a migrant worker with
higher salary then working locally. However, the variable Family Wage may be difficult to
interpret as it is hard to tell if higher wages cause an individual to work away from home or
becoming a migrant worker increases the person’s salary.
For Model 3, I expect that income-related variables, such as income, family income,
savings, both subsidiaries, and land rental should have a negative effect on migrant worker as
people have less need in money and better work opportunities. For expense-related variables,
such as expanse, medical, food, house, and mortgage, I expect a positive effect on migrant
worker as people have a larger need of money in life.
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4. Results
4.1 Regression Results
The regression result from Model 1 shows that both education and hukou have significant
effect on migrant worker. For each level increase in education, the probability of an individual to
become a migrant worker will increase by 3.81%. This result matches my expectation about the
education variable. However, as of hukoudummy, having an urban hukou is likely to increase the
probability of migrant worker by over 12.2%. From the result of the third regression which
Model 1 and Model 2 are ran together, the significance of hukoudummy has doubled to 24.4%.
The regression result on hukoudummy has a high significance level but appears to be
counterintuitive. It indicates that urban hukou holders are at least 12.2% more likely than rural
hukou holders to work in cities away from their permanent residence. The general expectation
regarding the relationship between hukou status and migrant worker status is that people with
rural hukou are more willing to become a migrant worker as they can earn more by working in
non-agricultural industries in cities. However, one explanation for this regression result is that
many urban hukou holders whose hukou registered places are small cities are also willing to
work in larger cities such as the capital cities of each provinces. Based on the definition of
migrant worker in my study, it is understandable that compared to the thousands of cities in
China, a handful of the top largest cities will always be the most coveted destinations for people
who want to work away from their home residence.
Since many variables in Model 1 and Model 2 are correlated, the coefficient of
hukoudummy in regression 3 is doubled to 24.4%. The overall results in regression 3 appear to
have a higher significance level. It is also reflected in the coefficient of education that almost
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doubled in regression 3 compared to regression 1. Regardless of the increase in number of
variables in regression 3 and the increase in R-squared from less than 1% in regression 1&2 to
2.47% in regression 3, the two sets of variables may affect each other. For instance, one’s age
and marriage status will have influence on his/her likelihood of having their parents to live with
the family or not. Dummy variable of child, number of children, and family count are also
correlated with each other. Therefore, results from regression 3 should be more relevant and
accurate.
Similar results happen in Model 2 as well. While most family-related variables appear to
be very significant, the number of children and live with family tend to have negative effects on
the dependent variable. For each extra child an individual has, the probability of him/her to
become a migrant worker decreases at 2.76% and even higher at 4.1% if taken variables from
Model 1 into account.
The amount of family member and the total family wages also have a small positive and
significant effect on the dependent variable. In Model 3, for each 1,000 yuan increase in the
family wage, the probability of one being a migrant worker will increase by 0.06%; for each 1
more person as a migrant worker in family, the probability of one being a migrant worker will
increase by 6.3%.
The result from total_family_migrantworker also indicates that having one or more
family members as a migrant worker will have a positive effect on individuals becoming migrant
workers. This result matches the discovery from a previous study on migrant worker network
which states that current migrant workers will have a positive effect on non-migrant-workers
from their own village, whereas returned migrant workers will have a negative effect (Zhao,
2003).
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To run Model 3, I generated a series of variables that are multiplied by 1,000 from the
original variables for a better presentation in terms of regression results. Because these monetary
variables are counted in the unit of 1 yuan, for the better presentation of coefficients, I multiple
and generate related variables so that the coefficients can be interpreted in units of 1,000 yuan.
Any variable with “1000” at the end of its name is generated in this way, except mortgage which
was in units of 10,000 yuan. It has been eliminated from regressions because the observations are
too less to construct a probit regression along with other variables.
I conduct 4 rounds of OLS regression based on Model 3 and results are shown in Table 5.
The first regression in Table 5, which is regression 4 of the study, is set to consist only the
expenditure variables in the model. Regression 5 contains only the income variables from Model
3. Regression 6 combines the main variables from both expenditure and income categories and
eliminates variables with less observations to cover a larger part of the entire sample. Regression
7 includes all variables from both expenditure and income categories mentioned in previous
regressions.
The results from Table 5 partially verify my expectation about Model 3. There are only
two variables from regression 4 and 5 contain a significant coefficient. Med1000 in regression 4
indicates that for each 1,000 yuan increase in the medical expanse for one’s household, the
probability of the person to become a migrant worker will increase by 0.106%. In regression 5,
Total_retirement_subsidiary indicates that for each 1,000 yuan increase in the retirement
subsidiary of one’s household, the probability of the person to become a migrant worker will
increase by less than 0.001%, similar to no effect at all.
Regression 6 eliminates Total_retirement_subsidiary and Total_government_subsidiary
for the lack of valid observations and that they do not represent a wage income which takes time
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and effort. The results of regression 6 shows that med1000 is still the only variable that has a
significant coefficient value. For each 1,000 yuan increase in medical expense for one’s
household, the probability that the person will become a migrant worker will increase by
0.104%. Including med1000, the signs of each coefficient in regression 6 almost remain the same
if compared with regression 4 and 5. The coefficients are also way below 1% in all cases.
While all 4 regressions in Table 5 have a significant constant, regression 7 has the highest
value of pseudo R-squared. The observation number is decreased to less than 1,700 in regression
7 and the value of most coefficients are increased accordingly. While med1000 is still the only
variable that has a significant coefficient, variables such as food1000 and house1000 have
increased by more than 10 times. Their coefficients indicate that that for each 1,000 yuan
increase in food and house expenditure, the likelihood of one becoming a migrant worker will
increase by 0.173% and 0.154%. Other variables still display an almost neutral effect to the
dependent variable.

Limitations and Policy Implications
The major limitation of this study is that it does not follow the official definition of
migrant workers. Officially, individuals who work away from their household registered place
for more than 6 months are considered as migrant workers. However, due to data limitation, I
was unable to limit the samples within this time range. Another limitation is that the study did
not control for work types of agricultural or non-agricultural, which may display a clearer
difference in individuals’ choices. There are also many missing observations, for instance
income, from the raw data and may affect the final regression results.

35

The results from this study indicate that individuals tend to care more about their
responsibilities to their offspring compared to their parents or other relatives. It is also logical
that parents tend not to leave their children for work but to company them at home. One policy
implication for the government to attract more migrant workers, especially those young couples,
would be to invest in younger level education facilities to support a larger group of children, or
to offer more compensations for the migrant parents to raise children below a certain age. This
may increase their interest in working away from home knowing that they may bring their
children together to the urban areas.

Conclusion
In general, the regression results all show a significant effect on the dependent variable
migrant worker and suggest that most family factors do have a huge impact on one’s decision in
becoming a migrant worker or not. The most significant results are from the first and second
model where individual characteristics and non-monetary family characteristics are considered.
It is clear that having other family members who are able to help an individual either financially
or physically, such as taking care of one’s house when he/she is away, will have a positive effect
on one’s probability in becoming a migrant worker. If, on the other hand, family members who
have difficulties in taking care of themselves or need someone to constantly be with them, are
considered as having a negative effect on one’s probability in becoming a migrant worker.
Variables of parent alive and children all show negative effects on the dependent variable
migrant worker.
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Monetary variables do not display much of a significance in terms of influence on the
dependent variable. The only variable with significant coefficient is medical expense, which for
each 1,000 yuan increase in medical expense, the probability of one to become a migrant worker
will increase by 0.5%. It can be interpreted in the way that medical expenses, unlikely other
everyday expense on food, house and other categories, often incur with a sudden and last for a
long period of time. Individuals may have difficulties in foreseeing such event or are able to use
insurance or other kinds of methods to prevent it. It could also be that many migrant workers,
especially those with rural hukou and work in construction industry, are more exposed to
accidents than others. In that case, it could be possible that it is being a migrant worker causes
the medical expenditure to increase rather than the other way around.
In conclusion, this study adds new perspective to the issue of migrant workers and
internal migrations in China by looking the family level of characteristics from the latest data
available rather than individual or institutional factors from a broader scale.
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Tables and Graphs:
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Characteristics
Variables

Observation

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Migrant worker

16,024

0.660

0.474

0

1

Age

16,036

42.037

15.80

16

104

Gender

16,036

0.507

0.500

0

1

Hukoudummy

14,613

0.337

0.473

0

1

Marriagedummy

16,036

0.763

0.425

0

1

Child

16,036

0.711

0.453

0

1

11,409

0.49

0.50

0

1

15,187

3.024

1.446

1

8

Lowedu**

5,523

1

0

1

1

Midedu***

7,293

1

0

1

1

Highedu****

2,371

1

0

1

1

16,036

0.80

0.40

0

1

SingleChild
Education

Parents Alive

Notes: *migrant workers with urban or rural hukou status; **illiterate/semi-literate and primary school;
***junior high school and senior high school; ****3 or 4 years of college and master’s/doctoral degree.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Family Characteristics
Variables

Observation

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Number of Children

16,041

1.277

1.170

0

10

Live in Family

16,055

0.909

0.288

0

1

Parent Finance

16,055

0.211

0.408

0

1

Parent live with Family

16,055

0.194

0.400

0

1

Family Count

16,055

4.295

2.013

1

17

Family Wage*

16,055

29173.43

56,058.96

0

2,200,000

Family Expense*

15,205

90012.23

131,296.4

104

5,169,220

Total Family Members as
Migrant Workers

16,055

0.873

1.154

0

9

Note*: Units in Chinese Yuan (CNY)
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Monetary Characters at the Family Level
Variables

Observation

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Income

4,138

38,305.47

167,372.6

70

10,300,000

Savings

16,041

56,972.43

151,821.9

0

4,000,000

Family Income

16,027

100,768

250,891.8

160

11,400,000

Total retirement subsidiary

4,763

19,184.64

23,492.13

50

210,000

Total government subsidiary

5,853

1,894.566

7,229.344

5

300,000

Land Rental

1,460

2,966.495

6,220.176

16

75,000

Expense

16,041

90,012.74

131,342.6

104

5,169,220

Food

15,958

21,535.75

19,457.84

24

600,000

House

15,793

11,664.55

32,819.31

16

551,440

Medical

14,420

7,233.441

27,830.44

10

1,200,000

Mortgage1

1,869

250,890.3

3,409,966

100

60,000,000
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Table 4: Results from Model 1 and Model 2

VARIABLES
age

age2

gender

child

marriagedummy

hukoudummy

parentalive

lowedu

midedu

highedu

Number_of_Children

liveinfam

parentfinance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Control for
Provinces

Control for
Provinces

Control for
Provinces

No Control

-0.00142

-0.000637

-0.00202

(0.00184)

(0.00298)

(0.00301)

2.17e-05

2.61e-05

4.80e-05

(1.91e-05)

(3.16e-05)

(3.19e-05)

-0.00249

-0.0137

-0.0157

(0.00790)

(0.0115)

(0.0117)

-0.00165

0.0248

0.0583**

(0.0141)

(0.0240)

(0.0239)

0.0250**

0.0329*

0.0408**

(0.0123)

(0.0190)

(0.0192)

0.0463***

0.0899***

0.0961***

(0.00951)

(0.0133)

(0.0128)

0.00834

-0.00313

-0.00496

(0.0112)

(0.0170)

(0.0171)

-0.0547***

-0.0296

-0.0151

(0.0193)

(0.0290)

(0.0292)

-0.0377**

0.00560

0.0206

(0.0187)

(0.0268)

(0.0270)

0.00970

0.0539*

0.0734***

(0.0208)

(0.0282)

(0.0283)

-0.00685

-0.00857

-0.0280***

(0.00634)

(0.0103)

(0.0101)

0.000866

0.0857*

0.0895**

(0.0301)

(0.0442)

(0.0444)

0.134*

0.119

0.0988

41

(0.0716)

(0.0869)

(0.0873)

-0.119*

-0.0701

-0.0447

(0.0717)

(0.0864)

(0.0867)

0.0189***

0.0162***

0.0136***

(0.00359)

(0.00389)

(0.00385)

0.000338***

0.000186**

0.000202**

(8.68e-05)

(9.12e-05)

(8.74e-05)

0.0135

0.0286***

0.0255**

(0.00986)

(0.0105)

(0.0104)

0.628***

0.622***

0.434***

0.377***

(0.0529)

(0.0527)

(0.0880)

(0.0791)

Observations

14,608

6,990

6,635

6,635

R-squared

0.023

0.042

0.060

0.032

parentlivewfam

familycount

familywage1000

Total_family_migrantworker

Constant

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Results from Model 3
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

Control of
Provinces

No Control

Control of
Provinces

No Control

income1000

-0.00449

0.00143

-0.000117**

-0.000117**

(0.00570)

(0.00521)

(5.54e-05)

(5.57e-05)

0.00649

-0.00550

5.98e-05*

5.33e-05*

(0.00811)

(0.00410)

(3.11e-05)

(3.12e-05)

-0.000160

0.000915

3.87e-05

5.87e-05

(0.00777)

(0.00368)

(6.92e-05)

(6.77e-05)

-0.00308

-0.000337

-0.000168

-0.000163

(0.0132)

(0.00494)

(0.000105)

(0.000104)

-0.0343

0.00904

0.00122**

0.000862*

(0.0286)

(0.00930)

(0.000490)

(0.000480)

0.000709

0.00186

0.000371

0.000279

(0.0278)

(0.00818)

(0.000291)

(0.000291)

0.0202

-0.00325

0.000793**

0.000755**

(0.0261)

(0.0107)

(0.000335)

(0.000336)

0.0357

0.0407

(0.146)

(0.0454)

-0.0129

-0.00670

(0.0167)

(0.00648)

-2.57e-06

4.94e-06

(1.51e-05)

(6.03e-06)

1.642**

0.992***

0.599***

0.641***

(0.651)

(0.282)

(0.0587)

(0.0128)

familyincome1000

savings1000

expense1000

food1000

house1000

med1000

Total_gov_subsidi
ary1000

Total_retirement_
subsidiary1000

mortgage1

Constant
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Observations
R-squared

35

35

3,602

3,602

0.747

0.186

0.025

0.004

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix I:
Descriptive Data of Migrant Workers in 5 Provinces of the Largest Population from Data Set
Provincial
Regions

Observations

Mean of Migrant
Worker Annual
Income*

Mean of Non- 2 Sample t-test
Migrant Worker
of Unequal
Annual
Variances
Income*
Liaoning
1.342
28,962.59
43,430.3
-0.9392
(256)
(117)
Shanghai
1,128
57,829.71
55,816.51
0.3068
(213)
(83)
Henan
1.825
31,629.35
64,824.21
-0.5569
(283)
(108)
Guangdong
1,868
42,429.1
79,894.43
-0.8486
(311)
(233)
Gansu
1,630
29,087.4
32,116.25
-1.0885
(230)
(93)
*Numbers of observations are in brackets below the mean values. All units are in Chinese Yuan
(CNY).

